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Abstract
This paper studies data from the wholesale fruit and vegetables market in
Marseille. The special feature of the data is that we have details of counterof-
fers to the prices that were proposed by the seller even when no transaction
took place. Each offer, counteroffer and refusal conveys information to the two
parties concerned about the state of the market since no prices are posted and
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there is ignorance of the total quantities available of each product. We exam-
ine the evolution of prices during the day and analyse the relation between the
final price struck and the proposals of the two parties. We show what happens
to the seller’s first price and to the transaction price as the seller revises his
idea of the distribution of the buyer’s reservation price. We show that periods
with no buyer refusals, of offers or bargaining with no transaction will lead
to a revision of the seller’s first price. More importantly the sharing of the
surplus moves in the buyer’s favour during the day. These presumptions are
then shown to be confirmed by our data set.
JEL Codes: C78, D44, Q13
Keywords: Bargaining, Markets
1 Introduction
The bargaining literature presents several problems when one confronts it with em-
pirical facts. In many markets, unlike the situation in the Rubinstein (1982) frame-
work haggling does, in fact, take place. It is almost never the case that we have
details of the intermediate offers and counteroffers that make up such haggling and
this is particularly true of those cases in which bargaining took place but no bargain
was struck. Data on final transactions does not reveal the process by which the
final bargain was arrived at. This would be of no importance if the offers and coun-
teroffers that are made during the bargaining process had no influence on the final
outcome. However, if we regard them as revealing information then this is unlikely
to be the case.
In this paper we present evidence from the wholesale fruit and vegetable market
in Marseille and we analyse the data for four products. This data contains details
of the prices asked and the counteroffers made even when no transaction took place.
This situation is difficult to fit into the existing literature. What happens in reality
is that both buyer and seller get information about ”the state of the market” as
the day goes on. Each price proposed conveys information to the buyer and each
counteroffer, or refusal provides information for the seller.
In a market with perishable goods or in one where buyers can be separated
according to how long they remain in the market one might expect to see declining
prices over the day. Although in a world where waiting is not costly the prices
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at the end of the day should be the same as at the beginning if the appropriate
strategies were adopted there are various explanations for the fact that, in reality,
this phenomenon is frequently observed. The literature on the ”declining price
phenomenon” in auctions, Ashenfelter (1989); McAfee and Vincent (1993); Pezanis-
Christou (1997) bears witness to this. However, curiously in Ha¨rdle and Kirman
(1995), we found that this feature was essentially absent from the Marseille fish
market.
To get a clearer picture of the evolution of prices in this market, one could think
of relating the analysis to the bargaining under two-sided uncertainty literature. In
that case, both buyer and seller have information which is unknown to the other,
and it is typically assumed that the information in question is the ”value” of the
object over which bargaining is taking place. In our case the information that is
being implicitly conveyed is the aggregate quantity available and hence which prices
may obtain. Thus, a refusal of a price by a buyer may reflect his having found
a cheaper price elsewhere or that he has little fear of not finding what he wants
elsewhere. This information should be useful to the seller who may then modify
the price he has set. Similarly, if several buyers, in succession, accept the price
asked then the seller might reasonably infer that this product is in short supply
and then modify his price accordingly. In other words, the behaviour of the buyer
is a signal about his reservation price which, in turn, reflects his ideas about the
distribution of prices available. The problem is that the situation we have described
does not correspond to the standard literature since several different partners are
involved successively. Thus the offers and counteroffers in one matching influence
those made in a subsequent matching but the new partner does not have the same
information as if he were there from the outset.
If all agents of each type, buyer or seller were identical, the fact that the market
unfolds in this fashion would have no significance. However, the problem would be
of a different nature since each seller would be aware of the state of the market
from the outset. As it is, sellers obtain their stocks from different sources, they have
certain clients who are loyal and do not go elsewhere, and the clients have different
demands. Thus, although the price charged to each specific buyer is particular to
the seller involved, that price is influenced by the general state of the market. What
price I, as a buyer, can obtain today will depend on what the seller I visit has had
3
to pay and his view of the quantity available on the market today. The maximum
price that I am willing to accept, my reservation price, will depend on the offers
that I have obtained previously and my view of the quantity available. Each time
there is a meeting information is conveyed and the price asked in the next period
may be influenced by that information. Since our data is for one seller we cannot
track the reactions of buyers as they move from one seller to another. However, we
can observe the reactions of our seller to each meeting. The purpose of this paper
is to examine those reactions.
2 Our data
We have data for 15 trading days in March of the year 1983. In total, we have 3960
observations for 4 kinds of fruit and vegetables. These are leek, domestic tomatoes,
imported tomatoes and oranges. The oranges and the imported tomatoes are from
Spain, whereas the leek and the domestic tomatoes are from France. Every trading
day is divided into time grids. From 7 to 9 o’clock, the length of a grid is 2 minutes
30 seconds. Thus, there are 48 time intervals with equal length. From 9 to 12
o’clock, the length of the grid is 10 minutes. Thus, there are 18 intervals of equal
length.
Figure 1 depicts the way in which a meeting on the wholesale fruit and vegetable
market in Marseille might unfold. The seller makes an initial price offer p∗1 which
is either accepted or rejected. If the buyer accepts a Transaction occurs with No
Bargaining (TNB) at the offered price. Thus, the transaction price p is equal to p∗1.
If the buyer rejects he may either make a counteroffer c or walk away. In the latter
case, the meeting ends without a deal being struck and we Only observe the seller’s
Offer price (OO). If he makes a counteroffer then both parties either agree on a
transaction price somewhere in the closed interval defined by c and p∗1 or stop the
negotiation. In the wholesale fruit and vegetable market in Marseille this final round
of bargaining usually takes the form of the seller making a second and final price offer
p∗2, given c and p∗1. If the buyer accepts then we observe three prices—that are p∗1,
c, and p∗2—and refer to this outcome as a Transaction With Bargaining (TWB). In
that case, the transaction price p is equal to p∗2. In the opposite case we observe the
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seller’s initial Offer and the buyer’s Counteroffer (OC) but no transaction occurs.ff


seller proposes p∗1
?ff


buyer accepts?
?
no
-
yes
TNB
observed: p∗1 = p
ff


counteroffer?
?
yes
-
no
OO
observed: p∗1
ff


agreement?
?
yes
-
no OC
observed: p∗1, c
TWB
observed: p∗1, c, p∗2 = p
Figure 1: How a meeting between seller and buyer may evolve.
Table 1 shows the relative frequency of the categories for the different sorts of
vegetables, cumulated over all days. Whereas the frequencies of “offer only” and
“offer and counteroffer” for the two types of tomatoes and oranges are quite similar,
the behavior on the leek market is different. For the former vegetables, in less than
2.5% of contacts no transaction occurs. For the latter, about 17.5% of all contacts
end without a transaction. The total frequency of contacts with counteroffers are
35.05% for leek, 28.69% for domestic tomatoes, 35.26% for imported tomatoes and
40.51% for oranges. However, we have also examined the frequencies of the last
four categories that are equivalent to a contact. Table 2 shows the distribution
of the categories given that a contact happened. The first two columns confirm
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Table 1: Whole database: relative frequency of the categories for the different
sorts of vegetables (in percent)
contact
transaction
offer and no bar- bar-
no contact offer only counteroffer gaining gaining
leek 41.11 11.62 5.96 12.22 29.09
domestic tomatoes 58.59 1.72 0.51 11.01 28.18
imported tomatoes 51.72 1.11 0.61 11.92 34.65
oranges 53.03 1.11 0.91 5.35 39.60
the observation that it was more difficult to strike a deal for leek than for the other
products. As we have already mentioned, this observation grid is not equally spaced.
Table 2: Whole database: relative frequency of the categories for the
different sorts of vegetables given that contact took place (in percent)
transaction
offer and
offer only counteroffer no bargaining bargaining
leek 19.73 10.12 20.75 49.40
domestic tomatoes 4.15 1.22 26.59 68.05
imported tomatoes 2.30 1.26 24.69 71.76
oranges 2.37 1.94 11.40 84.30
Whereas we have 48 observations per product and day before 9 o’clock, we have only
18 observations from 9 to 12 o’clock. To take account of this, we separated the data
and Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6 will present the distributions of the different categories for
the two different observation periods. An important question is as to how the
negotiations evolve during the course of the day? Figure 2 shows that the number of
negotiations for leek diminished during the trading day. This result reflects the first
entries in Tables 3 and 5. The fact of a diminishing number of negotiations is much
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Table 3: Observations from 7 to 9 o’clock: relative frequency of the categories
for the different sorts of vegetables (in percent)
contact
transaction
offer and no bar- bar-
no contact offer only counteroffer gaining gaining
leek 34.44 13.61 6.81 14.17 30.97
domestic tomatoes 31.99 2.86 0.84 18.18 46.13
imported tomatoes 55.28 1.39 0.69 12.92 29.72
oranges 57.64 1.53 1.11 6.67 33.06
Table 4: Observations from 7 to 9 o’clock: relative frequency of the cat-
egories for the different sorts of vegetables given that contact took place
(in percent)
transaction
offer and
offer only counteroffer no bargaining bargaining
leek 20.76 10.38 21.61 47.25
domestic tomatoes 4.21 1.24 26.73 67.82
imported tomatoes 3.11 1.55 28.88 66.46
oranges 3.61 2.62 15.74 78.03
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Table 5: Observations from 9 to 12 o’clock: relative frequency of the categories
for the different sorts of vegetables (in percent)
contact
transaction
offer and no bar- bar-
no contact offer only counteroffer gaining gaining
leek 59.22 6.67 3.53 6.67 23.92
domestic tomatoes 98.98 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.02
imported tomatoes 41.96 0.39 0.39 9.41 47.84
oranges 39.61 0.00 0.39 1.96 58.04
Table 6: Observations from 9 to 12 o’clock: relative frequency of the
categories for the different sorts of vegetables given that contact took place
(in percent)
transaction
offer and
offer only counteroffer no bargaining bargaining
leek 16.35 8.65 16.35 58.65
domestic tomatoes 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
imported tomatoes 0.68 0.68 16.22 82.43
oranges 0.00 0.65 3.25 96.10
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more pronounced for domestic tomatoes, see Figure 3. We observe no negotiation
after 9.50 o’clock. This illustrates the result from Table 5: in 98.5% of the time
after 9 o’clock no contact happens. In contrast to the results for the domestic
products, the number of negotiations increases for imported tomatoes and oranges,
see Figure 4 and 5. Once again, this is in accordance with the entries in the above
mentioned Tables. The frequencies of contacts show that the relative negotiations
volume is increasing during the course of the day. Thus, the behavior for domestic
products and imported products is different. With respect to the relative frequency
of meetings with counteroffer, the products are quite similar, see Figures 6 to 9.
In this paper we use our data to shed light on the following questions: 1. How did
the prices offered by the seller evolve during the day? 2. How did the sellers’ prices
react to a successful transaction or to the failure to transact? 3. How did buyers’
counteroffers evolve over the day? 4. What was the influence of the difference
between the seller’s price and that of the buyer on the probability of a transaction?
5. How did the transaction price relate to the seller’s and buyer’s price and did this
vary over the day?
3 Possible theoretical approaches
As has been mentioned, at first sight the problem posed here might be thought of as
corresponding to a bargaining situation with two-sided uncertainty. The price that
a seller is willing to accept is unknown to the buyer and the price that a buyer is
willing to pay is unknown to the seller at each point in time. This setting seems to
be related to that in which each player has a private reservation value as described
by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983). However, for their results they require that
the reservation values be drawn from distributions, which are known to each of the
partners, even though the particular values are not known. In our case the values
are under constant revision. Each meeting corresponds to the situation involved in
Myerson and Satterthwaite’s analysis except for the fact that the distribution of each
player’s reservation value has been modified by his experience. Thus, at any point
in time there is no reason to believe that the distributions of the two bargainers will
coincide.
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Figure 2: Product leek. Average number of contacts (upper solid) and negotiations
(lower dashed) during the course of the day
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Figure 3: Product domestic tomatoes. Average number of contacts (upper solid) and
negotiations (lower dashed) during the course of the day
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Figure 4: Product imported tomatoes. Average number of contacts (upper solid) and
negotiations (lower dashed) during the course of the day
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
7:00 7:30 8:00 8:30 9:00 9:30 10:00 10:30 11:00 11:30
Figure 5: Product oranges. Average number of contacts (upper solid) and negotia-
tions (lower dashed) during the course of the day
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Figure 6: Product leek. Fraction of meetings with counteroffers
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Figure 7: Product domestic tomatoes. Fraction of meetings with counteroffers
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Figure 8: Product imported tomatoes. Fraction of meetings with counteroffers
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
7:00 7:30 8:00 8:30 9:00 9:30 10:00 10:30 11:00 11:30
Figure 9: Product oranges. Fraction of meetings with counteroffers
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The question then becomes one of what happens when both partners have formed
an idea of the state of the market. In this case one would expect to find a con-
vergence to a conventional bargaining problem. A second problem arises in our
particular case. Learning is accompanied by transactions; the process is one of non-
tatonnement. Thus the reservation price of the parties will be conditioned not only
by their knowledge of the market situation but also by their sales or purchases up
to that point.
Given these difficulties we tried, as a first approach, to examine a certain number
of plausible hypotheses and to establish a certain number of stylised facts, which
would be consistent with the theory for simpler situations.
The central theme of this paper is the influence of bargaining on the probability
of transactions and on the behaviour of buyers and sellers.
3.1 Buyer’s behaviour
An important question here is as to how buyers revise their reservation prices. They
are searching in the market and given the distribution of prices that they observe
they will modify their reservation prices. Can we reduce our situation to that anal-
ysed in standard search models? There the situation is clear. There is a distribution
of sellers’ prices amongst which buyers search and, in the standard version, the rule
is simple. Search until one finds that price which is such that the gain from an
additional search is just equal to the cost of making that search. Formally if the
cumulative density of prices is given by F (p) and the cost is c, then the reservation
price is given by R such that:∫ R
0
(R− p)dF (p) =
∫ R
0
F (p)dp = c (1)
The first problem is that F is assumed to be known and to be fixed during the search.
This is important since as Gastwirth (1976) pointed out the mis-specification of F
may lead to a highly inefficient level of search. As he pointed out, if someone based
their reservation price on a uniform distribution while the distribution was in fact
triangular on the same support he would, in expectation spend twice as much and
would search five times more often than if he was correctly informed.
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In our case the buyer does not know the true distribution and what is more that
distribution is changing over time. To clarify ideas we can adopt an approach sug-
gested by Rothschild (1974) in a classic paper. Since prices have to be in monetary
units and they are evidently bounded it is reasonable to assume that there is a finite
number, say n of them. The prices p1, p2 . . . pn are arranged in ascending order and
the distribution of prices is then a multinomial distribution Π where,
Π ∈ ∆ = {(p1, p2 . . . pn) ∈ Rn|pi > 0,
∑
pi = 1} (2)
Now suppose that the buyer does not know Π but has a prior F (·) over ∆. He then
updates his prior using Bayes’ rule. He does this using the information available at
each time. His information consists in the number of times Ni he has observed the
ith price, so this information can be represented by the vector,
N = (N1 . . . Nn) (3)
or more conveniently, one can think of the vector λ in the simplex ∆ where,
λi =
Ni∑n
j=1Nj
(4)
This vector is updated in the obvious way as an observation is made. Under
reasonable conditions such a process will converge to the true distribution. There
are technical problems with the initial prior (see Rothschild 1974) but if the number
of observations becomes sufficiently large this can be ignored. Yet, in the case in
question, updating is basically limited to one day. Buyers are faced each day with
a distribution that is not the same as on the previous days. Thus they are obliged
to start with a relatively uninformative prior.
One answer to this problem would be to think of a situation where, on each day,
the price in the outside market where the sellers obtain their stocks is either high
or low. The problem of the buyer then becomes to decide whether he is sampling
from a distribution with mean µh or mean µl where µh > µl.
Early in the day he is faced with a classical problem in economics that of choosing
between profiting from the opportunity he is currently faced with and gaining more
information by searching again. The gain in information about the distribution is
offset by the potential lost opportunity if the seller no longer has stocks available.
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Here again the situation is not simple since the distribution is constantly being
modified in two ways. Firstly some sellers are no longer active when they have sold
all their stock and secondly as the day goes on they, in turn, modify their prices.
The situation for each buyer and seller is then reduced to two steps. Once he
observes the prices or reactions he has to decide which is the prevalent distribution.
Then he has to decide on his bargaining behaviour. This will be true even when the
distribution of seller’s prices is more degenerate. How will the buyers’ reservation
prices evolve over day? Those who have high reservation prices to start with will
disappear from the market since they will accept offers except from very high price
setters. At each successive round those who will be left in the market are buyers
with initially low reservation prices faced with higher priced sellers. However, any
given seller will be faced with a distribution that is being truncated from the top.
Even though buyers maybe revising their prices upwards, the distribution will be
shifting down.
3.2 The timing of negotiations
Two things are important to note here. The information provided by our seller
suggested that the larger buyers operate early in the morning and it is the case
that there are proportionally more sales without negotiation in the earlier period
of the market. This would be consistent with the evidence provided by Weisbuch,
Kirman, and Herreiner (2000) that large sellers typically do not ”shop around” and
become ”locked in” to particular sellers. Many economic explanations can be given
for this fact, such as the existence of implicit contracts or preferential treatment.
The argument used in the paper referred to was one of simple reinforcement learning.
However with one exception there is little evidence that volume decreases over the
day and we will come back to this later. It might seem to be the case that as
the market unwinds the negotiators would arrive at a one shot sub game perfect
equilibrium and that this would remove counteroffers at the end of the day.
With the exception of local tomatoes which were never sold after 9h.30 trans-
actions continued till the official closing time, see Figures 6 to 9. In the case of
perishable goods one phenomenon that one might expect to see is a version of the
ultimatum game. However no obvious distinction can be made between the be-
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haviour of the market for oranges and that for imported tomatoes, for example.
Consider first of all the prices proposed by sellers as time passes. As can be
seen from Figures 10 to 13 three different patterns emerge. The prices proposed
for oranges and imported tomatoes are practically constant over the day. No trend
is statistically detectable. The prices of leeks decline steadily over the day whilst
local tomatoes on average are constant till 8h.30 and then drop sharply and become
constant again at 9h.
How might one set about explaining these differences? A first observation is that
those products with constant prices are both imported. This means that they were
bought on a large foreign wholesale market at a price that is essentially common
knowledge. Each seller has a fairly precise idea of what the other sellers have paid.
The state of the market in terms of the quantities available is thus not difficult to
estimate. The only difficulty would come from demand side uncertainty. The stylised
fact here would then be that prices for oranges and imported tomatoes would be
fairly constant across the market whilst those for leeks and domestic tomatoes would
vary at least at the beginning of the day. Two sided learning is taking place on the
market for domestic products whilst in the other markets the learning is much more
limited.
3.3 A basic theoretical model
We will use the model developed by Grossman and Perry (1986) as a basis for our
analysis. They developed a model in which a buyer bargains with a seller and where
information about the reservation prices is incomplete. In their case the distribution
of the buyer’s reservation price is known but the realisation is not. The seller’s
reservation price is assumed to be public knowledge. The negotiation involves one
indivisible unit of a good. The game is structured as follows:
- At t the seller makes an initial offer
- At t+ 1 the buyer accepts or makes a counteroffer
- At t+ 2 the seller accepts the counteroffer or makes a new offer
- This process continues until an offer is accepted.
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Figure 10: Product leek. Average offer (upper dashed), transaction price (middle
solid), and counteroffer (lower dotted)
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Figure 11: Product domestic tomatoes. Average offer (upper dashed), transaction
price (middle solid), and counteroffer (lower dotted)
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Figure 12: Product imported tomatoes. Average offer (upper dashed), transaction
price (middle solid), and counteroffer (lower dotted)
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Figure 13: Product oranges. Average offer (upper dashed), transaction price (middle
solid), and counteroffer (lower dotted)
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An outcome of the game is denoted by a pair (p, t) which means that a bargain
is struck at price p at time t. No agreement is denoted by (0,∞). In Grossman
and Perry’s setting delay is costly because of impatience but here the reason for
termination may be the existence of outside alternatives. For the seller the possible
arrival of other buyers and for the buyer the possibility of visiting other sellers.
Therefore, for us, a termination at t without a bargain may be denoted by (0, t).
At each point in time the seller has a prior distribution on the buyer’s reservation
price, F (x) and in the Grossman Perry model this distribution is common knowledge.
In their notation an action for a player is an acceptance of the previous offer or a
new counteroffer. Denote by Y the acceptance of an offer and an action is, at each
period, an element of {Y } × <+.
A history H(t) is a sequence of actions of each of the two players and a strategy
is a choice of an action at each point in time given H(t).
In their model there is a discount factor δ such that if the expected value for
the player of playing the game today is V (a, b) then the value tomorrow if there no
change in the support of the distribution is δV (a, b).
In our case the value of waiting is the value of replaying with the same player or
of playing with the next buyer or seller.
The basis result shown by Grossman and Perry is the following:
Proposition 1. If the seller initially believes that the buyer’s reservation price
is drawn from a fixed distribution on [a, b], then along the equilibrium path there
are numbers, xa, xc, p, and pa such that the seller makes an offer p which is ac-
cepted if x > xa and rejected otherwise. The rejecting buyer’s reservation price falls
into one of two intervals: If x ∈ [xc, xa] then the buyer makes an acceptable offer
pa > δV (xc, xa) and if x ∈ [a, xc] then the buyer makes an unacceptable offer. An
unacceptable offer reveals that x ∈ [a, xc] and the process starts again with the new
beliefs now on [a, xc].
In our case the result of Grossman and Perry does not apply directly since the
seller’s reservation price is not zero but is what he considers to be the value of playing
with someone else. Their model does, however provide us with insight as to how the
process develops between two agents and suggests that one should see offers which
are taken, counteroffers which are accepted and new offers which are accepted. The
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distribution F (x) is revised at time t and we must then ask the question as to how
the observations up to a certain point affect the revision. First we will present a
model which represents the seller’s choice of his initial price and then a revision
process and then we will consider what the predicted sign of the effect of various
types of observation should be on the parameter governing the revision process.
3.4 Seller’s first and second price
Assume that the seller’s guess about the distribution of x—that is the reservation
value of the buyer—is given by the following family of density functions
f(x) =
fb + 2 b−xb−a
(
1
b−a − fb
)
for x ∈ [a, b] ,
0 else .
(5)
where
fb ∈
[
0,
1
b− a
]
(6)
is just f(b). It is easy to check that the density function is a linear non-increasing
function in x. If we set
fb =
1
b− a , (7)
then we obtain the density of the Uniform distribution. For fb = 0, we obtain the
density of the Triangular distribution.
The corresponding distribution function is
F (x) =

0 for x < a ,
1−
[
fb(b− x) + {1− fb(b− a)} ( b−xb−a)2] for x ∈ [a, b] ,
1 for x > b .
(8)
3.4.1 Behavior of the seller
The seller chooses the offer price to maximize his expected gain
p∗ = argmax(p− v)(1− F (p)) . (9)
Here, v ∈ (a, b) denotes the reservation valuation of the seller. The first term is just
his gain, given that he can strike the deal. The second term is the probability that
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the reservation value x of the buyer is above p. The offer price is implicitly given
by
1− F (p∗) = (p∗ − v)f(p∗) . (10)
For the second order condition
−2f(p∗)− (p∗ − v)fx(p∗) < 0 (11)
to be fulfilled, it is sufficient that
p∗ 6 b+ v
2
(12)
holds. For our family of density functions this inequality always holds.
To see that (12) is sufficient, one just has to calculate the second order condition
(11) for our family of density functions. You will find that the second order condition
is fulfilled if (12) holds. To proof that the inequality for the optimal offer price always
holds, write the first order condition as
fb{b+ v − 2p∗}+ 1− fb(b− a)(b− a)2 {(b+ v − 2p
∗)2 − (p∗ − v)2} = 0 . (13)
Now, let us as assume firstly that
fb ∈
(
0,
1
b− a
)
.
We show, no p with
p ∈
(
b+ v
2
, b
]
(14)
is a solution of the first order condition: when p is in this range, it follows imme-
diately that the expression in the first curly brackets of the first order condition is
negative. To have a solution, the expression in the second curly brackets must be
positive. However, at the lower bound (b+v)/2 this expression is definitely negative.
At the upper bound b it is zero. Is it possible that the expression will be positive
for some intermediate values? In that case, the expression must be equal to zero at
least once. But we easily see that the solution for
(b+ v − 2p)2 = (p− v)2 ⇔
−(b+ v − 2p) = p− v
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is p = b (recalling that the expression on the RHS is non-positive and the expression
on the LHS is non-negative). Now, what happens if fb = 1/(b− a)? In that case, it
is easy to see that p∗ = (b+ v)/2. Eventually, for fb = 0 we have the two solutions
b and (b + 2v)/3, where only the latter fulfils the second order condition. Thus,
inequality (12) holds for p∗.
How does the optimal offer price change when fb increases? Total differentiation
of the first order condition yields
dp∗
dfb
=
Ffb(p
∗) + (p∗ − v)ffb(p∗)
−2f(p∗)− (p∗ − v)fx(p∗) > 0 . (15)
Let us explain how to derive the sign of this expression: the denominator is neg-
ative due to the second order condition. For the numerator we obtain after some
manipulations the expression
−
[(
1− b− p
∗
b− a
)
(b+ v − 2p∗) + b− p
∗
b− a (p
∗ − v)
]
< 0 . (16)
The term in the square bracket is positive: the optimal price is above a and less
than b, so that the fraction is positive and less than one. We know from (12) that
b+ v− 2p∗ > 0. The optimal offer price must always be above the reservation value
v of the seller.
For our family of density functions a higher fb is accompanied by a lower proba-
bility mass of low reservation values and a higher probability mass for higher reser-
vation values. A higher probability of good events makes the seller set a higher offer
price.
If we calculate the optimal price for the density with the lowest mass on high
reservation values (the Triangular distribution), we obtain
p∗|fb=0 = b+ 2v3 .
If we calculate the optimal price instead for the distribution that puts the largest
mass on high reservation values (the Uniform distribution), we obtain
p∗|fb= 1b−a =
b+ v
2
.
Using (15), we obtain that
p∗ ∈
[
b+ 2v
3
,
b+ v
2
]
, (17)
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where p∗ is increasing in fb.
It is not difficult to prove that the seller always prefers higher values of fb, because
this increases his expected gain. We obtain (using the first order condition)
Π∗fb = −(p∗ − v)Ffb(p∗) > 0 (18)
with
Ffb(p
∗) = −(b− p∗)
(
1− b− p
∗
b− a
)
< 0 . (19)
After observing the counteroffer c, the seller updates his guess about the distribution
of buyer’s reservation value x. Given the seller’s first offer p∗ and the buyer’s counter
offer c, the seller knows that x ∈ [c, p∗]. The conditional density is
f(x|c 6 x 6 p∗) =
D−1
{
fb + 2 b−xb−a
(
1
b−a − fb
)}
for x ∈ [c, p∗] ,
0 else ,
where the denominator is given as
D = F (p∗)− F (c) .
We will show, that we can rewrite the above given conditional density as
f(x|c 6 x 6 p∗) =
fp∗ + 2p∗−xp∗−c
(
1
p∗−c − fp∗
)
for x ∈ [c, p∗] ,
0 else ,
(20)
with
fp∗ = f(p∗|c 6 x 6 p∗) .
In that case, all results that we have derived for the optimal offer will also hold
for the second offer given the family of density functions (20). First, we extend
b − x = (b − p) + (p − x) in the original variant of the conditional density and we
obtain after deleting all equivalent terms that all we have to show is
1− (b− a)fb
(b− a)2 =
D{1− (p∗ − c)fp∗}
(p∗ − c)2 .
We derive the equivalence of both expressions by plugging in D and by using
−2(b− p∗)(p∗ − c) + (b− c)2 − (b− p∗)2 = (p− c)2 .
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4 Empirical results
In this section, we study the movement of the seller’s first and second price offers, p∗1
and p∗2, over the course of the trading day. How does the price setting behavior of the
seller evolve during the day in the light of his previous experiences? In particular,
does he react to periods of inactivity, refusals or counteroffers? Throughout, we will
use the theoretical results derived in the previous section to interpret the empirical
results.
Specifically, we employ the following variables to empirically describe the events
occurring up to and at a particular point in time t during any given trading day
• an (ex-post) bargaining power index (It)
It =
pt − ct
p∗1,t − ct . (21)
• the relative change in the initial offer price (pioffer,t)
pioffer,t ≡ p
∗
1,t − p∗1,t−1−τ
p∗1,t−1−τ
(22)
• the relative deviation of the offer from the counteroffer (∆t)
∆t ≡ p
∗
1,t − ct
p∗1,t
> 0 (23)
• the number of succeeding intervals with no contact (τt)
• dummy variables describing the outcome at t (di,t)
The ex-post measure of bargaining power I is observed if, at time t, the seller meets
a buyer, the two negotiate and strike a deal (outcome TWB in Figure 1). It relates
the difference between transaction price p (recall from the discussion of Figure 1
that p = p∗2 in this situation) and counteroffer c to the difference between the first
offer p∗1 and the counteroffer c. The index takes on values in the interval I ∈ [0, 1],
attains its maximum if p = p∗1 (when the seller prevails) and its minimum if p = c
(the buyer has his way).
25
The relative change in the initial offer price pi is simply the percentage change
in p∗1 relative to the last time period (t− 1− τ, with τ ≥ 0) when p∗1 was observed.
The relative deviation of the offer from the counteroffer ∆ measures how far apart
seller and buyer have been initially if bargaining occurred.
4.1 Seller’s first price
Starting with the seller’s initial price offer p∗1, the data shows no or very little move-
ment during most days for oranges, domestic and imported tomatoes while in the
market for leek p∗1 fluctuates during all 15 trading days, usually moving downwards
over time (as can be seen Figure 14 ). For this reason, we will mainly focus on the
latter market in the remainder of the analysis.
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Figure 14: Behaviour of initial offer prices for leek over time (as deviations from
their daily average).
To parsimoniously describe the (detrended) behavior of p∗1 over time we use the
“inflation”-type measure pioffer,t defined in (22). Table 7 shows that, in most cases,
pioffer,t is equal to zero. Indeed, for imported tomatoes and oranges, there are only
seven occasions of non-zero price movements during all 15 days.
4.1.1 Explaining the movements of p∗1 for leek
In this subsection, we use linear regression to explain the behavior of pioffer,t by
variables capturing the preceding history of inactivity, negotiations and transactions.
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Table 7: Inflation rates (22)
number of observations
mean std total with pi = 0 with pi < 0
leek -0.37 1.35 568 497 65
domestic tomatoes -0.02 0.49 395 390 4
imported tomatoes 0.00 0.64 462 455 4
oranges 0.00 0.85 448 441 4
In the spirit of the theory of section 3.4, the experience accumulated throughout
the day leads the seller to update fb, the parameter governing the shape of the
distribution of buyers’ reservation values he presumes to be facing. Table 8 shows a
contigency table for leek.
Table 8: Contingency table for leek: price change and categories
transaction
offer only offer and counteroffer no bargaining bargaining total
pi < 0 7.83 18.64 14.88 9.38 11.15
pi = 0 79.13 81.36 82.64 89.58 85.25
pi > 0 13.04 0.00 2.48 1.04 3.60
total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Note: Chi-square test of independence statistic with 6 degrees of free-
dom is 44.02, Pr = 0.000
For instance, periods of inactivity or series of non-cooperative buyers should lead
him to decrease fb and—by virtue of (15)—lead to reductions in p∗1,t. In the empirical
model we use the number of preceding intervals with no contact, τ, to capture
this effect, while ∆t−1−τ∆ and It−1−τI measure the influence of the last occurrences
(prior to time t) of unsuccessful and successful negotiations, respectively (where the
t − 1 − τ∆ and t − 1 − τI subscripts accommodate the possibility that these last
negotiations may have occurred prior to period t− 1− τ). We also included dummy
variables representing the outcome of the most recent meeting but only retained
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dOO,t−1−τ (where the “OO” subscript employs the notation of Figure 1 to indicate
an “offer only” meeting). Thus, we arrived at the following regression model:
pioffer,t,τ = β0 + β1τ + β2∆t−1−τ∆ + β3I˜t−1−τI + β4dOO,t−1−τ + . (24)
This specification focuses on the influence of the more recent events on the current
change in the seller’s offer price. Estimates of the coefficients β0, . . . , β4 are given in
Table 9.
Table 9: Explaining the behavior of pioffer for leek with a linear
regression
Coefficient t-statistic p-value
τ -.2418 -3.64 0.000
I˜t−1−τI 0.5620 3.42 0.001
∆t−1−τ∆ -2.3689 -1.84 0.067
dOO,t−1−τ -0.3205 1.91 0.058
constant -0.2955 -1.63 0.104
Regression diagnostics
R2 0.0622 R¯2 0.0547
F -Stat. 8.3 p-value(F -Stat.) 0.0000
Note: 506 observations are included.
The negative estimate of β0 reflects that, on the average, p∗1 moves downward.
The negative sign of the coefficient of τ implies that this downward tendency is
accelerated by periods of no contact. Similarly, the more seller and buyer have been
apart during previous negotiations (i.e. the larger ∆t−1−τ∆) the greater the seller’s
subsequent reduction in the initial offer price. To the contrary, the positive estimate
of β3 implies that preceding negotiations resulting in a transaction price close to the
seller’s initial offer (i.e., if I˜t−1−τI is large) slow down the seller’s tendency to lower
p∗1. Finally, the estimated negative effect of dOO,t−1−τ is evidence that an “offer only”
meeting in the most recent past is prompting the seller to lower the offer price.
Summing up, the estimates in Table 9 suggest that the speed with which the
seller reduces p∗1 during any given day is increased (decreased) if previous periods
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brought “bad news” (“good news”). In terms of the notation of the theory of section
3.4, “bad news” translates into a downward revision of fb, the parameter governing
the shape of the distribution of buyers’ reservation values. Given this downward
revision of fb, equation (15) shows that the rational response of the seller is to lower
p∗1.
4.2 Seller’s second price
Turning to the seller’s second price p∗2, Figure 15 shows a downward trend over
time for leek similarly to the one observed for the initial offer price. Yet, when we
estimated a regression model analogous to (24) for the change in transaction prices
all coefficients were insignificant, except the one for I˜t−1−τI which had the “wrong”
(i.e. positive) sign. We conclude from these (unreported) results that there is a
significant impact of the most recent past on the seller’s initial offer price but not
on his second price.
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Figure 15: Behaviour of transaction prices for leek over time (as deviations from
their daily average).
4.3 Bargaining index
From the discussion of Figure 1 it follows that we observe the seller’s second price
only if a transaction occurs, in which case p = p∗2. Hence, the bargaining index of
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equation (21) might be written in terms of p∗2 as
It =
p∗2,t − ct
p∗1,t − ct . (25)
Table 10 gives summary statistics for the bargaining index for each of the four
products. For each product, sample mean and median are greater or equal to 0.5.
Hence, averaged over all negotiations and regardless of day or time of day, the
transaction price (that is seller’s second price) tends to be closer to the seller’s
initial price offer than to the buyer’s counteroffer.
Table 10: Realizations of the bargaining power index (21) for the different
products
lower upper number of
mean std quartile median quartile observations
leek 0.67 0.35 0.50 0.71 1.00 406
domestic tomatoes 0.66 0.31 0.50 0.50 1.00 387
imported tomatoes 0.67 0.35 0.50 0.67 1.00 460
oranges 0.57 0.25 0.40 0.60 0.75 442
Note: the transaction price is missing for 8 observations of transactions with
bargaining. So, we can calculate the index only for 1695 observations.
The histograms in Figures 17 to 20, depicting the distribution of the index for
each product, have mass points at 0, 0.5 and 1. Hence, in most negotiations seller
and buyer either meet exactly half way between p∗1,t and ct or end up at either
extreme.
How does It evolve during the average trading day? Pooling the data of all four
products, Figure 16 shows a kernel smooth of the index with confidence intervals
at the 95% level (Ha¨rdle, 1990; Ha¨rdle, Klinke, and Mu¨ller, 2000). Hence, on the
average, index declines during the course of the day, with episodes of a particularly
rapid decline at the beginning and end of the trading day.
How can this apparent decline in the seller’s bargaining power be explained?
Since our data provides plenty of information about the single seller but very little
information about the many buyers he faces, we will try to explain the movement
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Figure 16: Smoothed bargaining power index. Confidence intervals at the 95% level.
in It by movements in p∗2,t. This line of reasoning is aided by the fact that in the
data the denominator of It is fairly constant over time, see Figures 10 to 13. We
may therefore set p∗1,t − ct = k and rewrite It as
It = 1− p
∗
1,t − p∗2,t
k
. (26)
Given that the buyer makes a counteroffer ct, it is reasonable to assume that the
second offer price will be in the interval [ct, p∗1,t]. For our family of density function
we obtain with result (17) that
p∗2,t ∈
[
p∗1,t + 2v
3
,
p∗1,t + v
2
]
.
If we assume that the buyer prepared to pay higher prices leave the market early
and that the ultimatum game effect comes into play then we are assuming that the
seller’s guess about fp∗1 decreases during the course of day. If we assume additionally
that (p∗1,t − p∗2,t) is increasing, then the index decreases during the day. Figure 21
clarifies the argument. It shows the evolution of p∗1,t − p∗2,t under the assumption
that fp∗1,t decreases through time. The total length of each interval from p
∗
1,t − ct
in Figure 21 is k. The reservation price v of the seller stays constant. As we have
already discussed in detail, the first price goes down and thus p∗1,1 > p∗1,2 > p∗1,3.
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Figure 17: Frequency of the bargaining power index (21) for leek.
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Figure 18: Frequency of the bargaining power index (21) for domestic tomatoes
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Figure 19: Frequency of the bargaining power index (21) for imported tomatoes
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Figure 20: Frequency of the bargaining power index (21) for oranges
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t = 1, fp∗1,1 =
1
k
c1 v p∗2,1 p∗1,1
t = 2, fp∗1,2 < fp∗1,1
c2 v p∗2,2 p∗1,2
t = 3, fp∗1,3 < fp∗1,2
c3 v p∗2,3 p∗1,3
Figure 21: Relation between first and second price.
The first interval shows p∗2 for the upper bound of fp∗1 . The second interval shows
p∗2 for a lower value of fp∗1 . In that case, we know with (15) and (17) that p
∗
2 will
be lower than (p∗1 + v)/2. If the difference between first price and v does not shrink
too much, then the difference between first price and second price increases. That
is what the second line in Figure 21 shows. The same lines of reasoning can be used
for the third interval.
However, given our family of density functions, simulating the index reveals
that the index increases over time given a constant reservation valuation v and a
decreasing fb. Here, the first price maximizes the seller’s expected gain given a, b,
v, k and fb, see equation (9). The second price maximizes the expected gain given
c = p∗1−k, p∗1, v and fp∗1 with the corresponding conditional density function f(x|c 6
x 6 p∗1). Optimal prices are calculated via numerical maximization methods. The
index is then calculated with equation (26). To derive a decreasing index over time,
we must allow furthermore that the reservation valuation of the seller decreases
over time. In that case, a decreasing index is possible. However, it is important to
mention that a decreasing vt suffices to generate a downward slopping index curve.
Figure 22 shows a simulated index where the reservation valuation decreases
with a rate of 4.5% between succeeding intervals. Here, we have set a = 0, b = 2,
v0 = 1.5 and k = 0.75. The density of fb starts with the density of the Uniform
distribution—that is fb = 0.5—and decreases over time and reaches at the end the
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Figure 22: Simulated bargaining power index, where both fb and seller’s reservation
valuation v decrease over time.
density of the Triangular distribution with fb = 0.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have analysed the effect of the bargaining process on prices. We have
observations not only on the prices of transaction but also on offers and counteroffers
even when no transaction took place. We first suggested a theoretical approach
to the overall problem faced by the seller that we observed and then suggested
a simple model to explain how the seller revised his beliefs over the day as he was
faced with different buyers. The model predicted that proposed prices would decline
over the day. More importantly we constructed an index of the seller’s bargaining
power and the model predicted that this would decline over the day. The data from
the wholesale fruit and vegetable market in Marseille was consistent with these
predictions.
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